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Abstract  
 
It is often taken more or less for granted that perpetrators of mass 
killings and other acts of violent atrocity dehumanise their victims in 
order to justify killing them. Drawing on the past decade of 
developments in psychological theories of dehumanisation, and on 
representations and explanations of killing provided by Islamic State, 
this paper argues for a more complex understanding of the role of 
notions about humanity and inhumanity in the legitimation of violence.  
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Introduction  
 
Dehumanisation, understood by Bandura (1996) as ‘divest[ing] people of 
human qualities or attribute[ing] bestial qualities to them’ such that they are ‘no 
longer viewed as persons with feelings, hopes and concerns but as subhuman 
objects’ is one of the most commonly cited psychological mechanisms used to 
explain mass killing and atrocious violence. Depending on how broadly the 
concept is understood, it is either integral to, or it is the fundamental ideational 
mechanism by which mass killing is to be explained.  
In this article, I will seek to challenge our present understanding of the 
role of dehumanisation in mass killing by means of a two-part argument. First, as 
I will show, recent research into dehumanisation carried out largely within the 
realm of experimental psychology has made some extremely interesting 
discoveries which, so far, have barely been recognised by researchers working 
on political violence. Taken together, these discoveries have the potential to turn 
the conventional understanding of dehumanisation on its head.  
Secondly, while dehumanisation seems to be conceived of by its 
theoretical proponents as universally applicable to situations of intercommunal 
killing, the empirical literature has tended to focus on rationalisations for killing 
in the context of inter-ethnic or colonial violence. In this paper, I will examine the 
role of ideas about humanity and inhumanity in justifying the violence carried 
out by ‘Islamic State’, a group which is, perhaps, par excellence, responsible for 
acts of intercommunal killing along sectarian and religious, rather than ethnic 
boundary lines. As I will argue, IS’s justifications for killing raise serious 
problems for the universality of dehumanisation as normally understood in the 
political violence literature, but can be fruitfully understood in terms of recent 
extensions of dehumanisation proposed by experimental psychology.  
 
 
Theories of Dehumanisation  
 
In attempts to explain how acts of atrocious violence and mass killing are 
psychologically possible for perpetrators, a common claim is that perpetrators 
act under the belief that their victims are not truly or fully human, in other words 
that they have psychologically ‘dehumanised’ them.  
From this general notion, two senses, both current in the collective 
violence literature can be drawn out. One of these is broad and encompassing of 
other related mechanisms. The other is relatively narrow.  
 
According to Herbert Kelman (1973): 
 
To understand the process of dehumanization we must first ask what it means to 
perceive another person as fully human in the sense of being included in the moral 
compact that governs human relationships. I would propose that to perceive 
another as human we must accord him identity and community…To accord a 
person identity is to perceive him as an individual, independent and distinguishable 
from others, capable of making his own choices, and entitled to live his own life on 
the basis of his own goals and values. To accord a person community is to perceive 
him - along with one’s self - as part of an interconnected network of individuals who 
care for each other, who recognise each other’s individuality, and who respect each 
other’s rights. These two features together constitute the basis for individual worth. 
 
In this conception, dehumanization can be taken more or less as a 
synonym for ‘moral disengagement’, since the notion of ‘humanness’ and the 
notion of being part of a moral community are treated as inseparable.  Indeed 
Savage (2013) argues that the term can be applied to all  ‘discursive strategies’ 
[which serve to] ‘den[y] that, in terms of the morality of the action, members of 
that group are worthy of the same treatment and consideration that would be 
afforded members of the in-group’. The word, he insists, can stand for or 
incorporate a variety of  ‘related or similar’ terms including ‘devaluation (Ervin 
Staub), moral exclusion (Staub and Susan Opotow), delegitimisation (Daniel Bar 
Tal), depersonalisation (Henri Tajfel), social death (Orlando Patterson), 
demonization, infra-humanisation and so forth’.  
Other scholars of collective violence seem, however, to understand the 
term in a somewhat narrower sense. For Albert Bandura (1996), 
dehumanization is a mechanism, not the mechanism by which moral 
disengagement is achieved. He understands it as a cognitive process which 
“divests people of human qualities or attributes bestial qualities to them. Once 
dehumanized, they are no longer viewed as persons with feelings, hopes and 
concerns but as subhuman objects”.  
David Livingstone Smith (2010), expanding greatly on the notion of 
‘bestial qualities’ argues that dehumanisation originates in forms of ‘folk biology’ 
(page 179) and ‘folk sociology’, (page 199) as well as ancient philosophical 
notions such as the ‘chain of being’ (page 44) whereby people were believed 
quite literally to possess animalistic or angelic qualities, based on supposed 
essences of moral worthiness. He argues that this process can be understood as 
underpinning the social ‘pseudospeciation’ (page 66) which he sees as analogous 
to the biological process by which initially phenotypically similar populations of 
organisms become genetically distinct.  
Despite this important (and often unobserved) distinction, theories of 
dehumanization in the context of collective violence appear to have in common 
five assumptions which, as I shall now argue, are beginning to be called into 
question by emerging research, these being: (1) the unitary or monolithic nature 
of dehumanisation as a process (2) the assumption that dehumanising beliefs are 
inherently essentialist (3) the assumption that dehumanisation is always 
pejorative (4) the assumption that dehumanisation is always applied to out-
groups rather than in-groups and, finally,  (5) the idea that dehumanisation 
necessarily implies moral exclusion.  
And yet, over roughly the past decade, a literature has emerged which 
implicitly or explicitly challenges every one of these assumptions.  
 
Dehumanisation as a monolithic phenomenon 
 
I have just observed how an important tension seems to be latent in the 
definitions of dehumanisation used by scholars of mass killing – between 
dehumanisation as primarily ‘the denial of a person’s humanity’ and 
dehumanisation as primarily ‘ejection from the sphere of equal moral standing’. 
Nonetheless, this tension has generally not been seen as problematic in practice. 
Denying people moral standing means treating them as less than fully human, 
and considering people to be less than fully human means denying them equal 
moral standing. As we have seen, even Smith (2010) sees the function of 
dehumanisation in ranking people in terms of moral worthiness  and its 
boundary marking role in ‘pseudospeciation’ as going hand in hand.  
Such monolithic and generalised claims about what it is to dehumanise, 
however, seem difficult to sustain given the now well-known assertion by Nick 
Haslam, arguably the most important psychologist working in the area of 
dehumanisation, that dehumanisation can be understood as at least two distinct 
processes, dependent on the denial of a fundamentally different conception of  
what it means to be human in the first place. Drawing on philosophical 
approaches to categorisation, Haslam (2006) insists that humanity can be 
conceived of either in terms of ‘uniquely human’ characteristics, or of ‘human 
nature characteristics’. The former are those attributes which only humans are 
thought to have, such as language or rational thought. The latter are qualities 
which are not unique to humans, but may be seen as prototypically human, such 
as the possession of primary emotions of a capacity for empathy. To believe that 
a particular individual is less than usually endowed with qualities of the former 
or the latter sort leads to two basic types of dehumanisation. Animal-like 
dehumanisation implies the lack of qualities of language, culture, knowledge and 
so on. On the other hand, ‘machine like’ dehumanisation implies the lack of 
‘human nature’ qualities such as emotionality or agency.  
The idea of dehumanisation as necessarily implying a radical act of moral 
exclusion is also called into question in a different sense by the notion of infra-
humanisation. While infra-humanisation, as coined by Leyens et. al. (2000) is a 
term specifically intended to allow ‘dehumanisation’ to be reserved for the most 
radical (and usually extremely violent) cases of moral disengagement by denial 
of humanity, it is unclear whether any firm distinction of kind, as opposed to 
degree, can be drawn between the relatively nuanced and everyday process of 
attribution of ‘infrahuman’ qualities to one group by another, and the role of 
‘dehumanisation’ in episodes of large scale collective violence and genocide. 
Indeed, in much of the psychological research, infrahumanisation and 
dehumanisation seem to be treated more or less interchangeably.  
 
Dehumanisation and essentialism   
 
Haslam’s division between animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation has 
not gone unacknowledged in the literature, but there is still not much 
consideration of whether it has particular implications for understanding how 
collective violence occurs, and what forms it takes. Smith seems at least 
implicitly to recognise Haslam’s division as posing problems for dehumanisation 
as a unified explanation for collective violence, but his response is to take issue 
with the theory on the grounds that it misunderstands – so he believes – the 
essentialist nature of dehumanising beliefs.  
In Smith’s argument, (2010, 94-95) human infants (for example) lack most of 
the qualities that Haslam regards as ‘uniquely human’ or ‘human nature’, but are 
not seen as less than human on that account. Therefore it follows that when 
particular categories of person are dehumanised, the claim is based not on 
specific (and potentially observable) traits, but rather on beliefs about invisible, 
pervasive qualities of inhumanity what would continue to exist however fully 
members of an out-group might appear to resemble those in the in-group.  
I am not aware of a direct response by Haslam to this line of criticism. 
However, given that Haslam’s work specifically derives from his own prior 
interest in the psychology of essentialism, (Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst, 2000), 
it seems unlikely that Haslam would wish to accept the idea that his two types of 
dehumanisation are incompatible with dehumanisation as an essentialist 
process. Nonetheless, a possible response to Smith is that Haslam’s work does 
indeed call into question the assumption that dehumanisation is essentialist in so 
far as it does not rely on any beliefs about the actual traits supposedly exhibited 
by those who are dehumanised.  Indeed, Smith’s example of the human infant 
can be turned on its head. After all human infants are dehumanised, in the sense 
that they are not only believed not to have the attributes of a fully competent 
individual, but also that they are ‘denied full standing in the moral community’. 
In many cultures, infanticide is considered acceptable prior to an infant’s 
initiation into its community. Conversely, the attribution of child-like qualities to 
adult members of another people is a common type of racist belief.  
Indeed, Haslam has produced empirical research (Loughnan, Haslam and 
Kashima, 2009) which specifically appears to show that people who are told that 
a fictional group has certain particular characteristics are consistently likely to 
liken its members to either animals or robots, as appropriate, and vice versa. In 
other words, dehumanising beliefs apparently can condition people to literally 
expect that individual members of particular groups will have specific 
observable qualities – not merely that they will be suffused with an 
unobservable essence of inhumanity.  
 
Dehumanisation as pejorative  
 
If notions of dehumanisation can arise – at least sometimes – from the 
belief that certain individuals or groups are deficient in certain human qualities, 
it seems to follow logically that individuals or groups may also be invested with 
super human qualities. Recently, the notion of superhumanity has begun to be 
explored in the literature. Haslam, Kashima, O’Loughnan and Shi (2008) 
examined the attributes which American, Chinese and Italian students assigned 
to three categories of being: animals, robots and supernatural beings. The 
authors noted that all three nationalities consistently regarded animals as 
inferior to humans in ‘uniquely human’ characteristics, robots as inferior in 
‘human nature’ attributes (although Chinese students had a better opinion of the 
capacities of robots than their counterparts), and of supernatural beings as 
superior in uniquely human, but not in human nature attributes. This seems to 
invite the inference that supernatural beings were seen by all three groups as 
relatively lacking in qualities like compassion, in which they were seen to equal, 
but not exceed, humans.  
Attributing superhuman characteristics to an out-group might seem to be 
no bad thing. But some argue that it, too, can serve to legitimate hostility . Waytz, 
Hoffman and Trawalter (2014) have demonstrated an apparent 
‘superhumanization bias’ among American whites regarding American blacks. 
They claim that white people tend to disproportionately associate black people 
words signifying superhuman powers, and that this apparently makes them less 
willing to believe that black people suffer equivalent levels of pain to those 
suffered by white people under similar conditions.  
Another idea which may be viewed as a distinctive form of 
‘superhumanisation’ has Mark Juergensmeyer (2000, 185). Focusing specifically 
on intergroup hatred in religious as opposed to ethnic contexts, he claims to 
identify a process he calls ‘satanization’, whereby enemies are imagined as 
uniquely threatening because of their association with evil, but also supernatural 
and superhuman powers.  
 
Self-dehumanisation  
 
  The idea that acts of violent atrocity and systematic abuse in some sense 
dehumanise perpetrators as well as victims is commonplace. However, theories 
of dehumanisation in collective violence have seldom made the leap of arguing 
that perpetrators might consciously or explicitly view themselves as other than 
fully human while actually engaged in inter-group violence. And yet the notion of 
‘self-dehumanisation’ has recently been explored by psychological research 
which has shown that people who have transgressed social norms do indeed 
commonly regard themselves as less human as a result. This seems to cut both 
ways in terms of its potential relationship to future norm-violation. On the one 
hand, where juvenile delinquents come to accept an image of themselves as less 
than human, this seems to make them more likely to feel justified in continuing 
to commit crimes. At the same time, however, where perpetrators of crimes 
publicly acknowledge their sense of reduced humanity, this paradoxically helps 
to rehabilitate them as humans the eyes of others.  Anders Breivik, Bastian and 
Crimston (2014) note, was widely seen as psychopathic and inhuman precisely 
because he did not see his own humanity as diminished in any way by the mass 
killing he had perpetrated.  
And yet according to Breivik’s own account, he deliberately underwent a 
process of moral disengagement from those he intended to kill. And indeed it 
would seem that killers quite often self-report processes akin to Haslam’s 
categories of mechanistic dehumanisation. Nazi soldiers, for example, spoke of 
having transformed themselves into mere ‘instruments’ (Neitzel and Weizer, 
2013). Such phenomena are hardly unobserved in the literature on mass killing, 
but they are typically explained in terms of concepts such as de-individuation or 
diffusion of responsibility rather than dehumanisation per-se. And yet, once the 
idea that dehumanisation can be self-ascribed, there seems to be little reason not 
to include such cases as examples of dehumanisation as well.  
 
Dehumanisation without moral exclusion  
 
The idea that dehumanisation is intimately related to outgrouping,  
‘othering’ or, specifically, moral exclusion runs as deep in the psychological 
research as it does elsewhere. However, as these studies seem to indicate, the 
relationship between the two may be more complex than sometimes seems to be 
assumed. Recent experimental work on outgrouping has demonstrated, 
paradoxically, that members of outgroups are actually viewed more negatively by 
members of ingroups when they clearly exhibit ‘humanising’ traits. This could be 
because of cognitive dissonance resulting from the desire to morally exclude a 
particular group. But it could also be because, as in the example of Breivik, the 
group in question is viewed not as morally dissociated, but rather as morally 
condemned, such that its failure to acknowledge its own reduced status is seen 
as adding insult to injury.  
Under this interpretation, dehumanisation can be seen not as a way of 
expelling people from one’s moral universe, but rather as a gradated mechanism 
of moral sanction which might serve to facilitate social inclusion. In this case the 
label reflects a status of moral condemnation for which an individual can make 
reparations in order to restore her previous status of full humanity. This idea has 
increasingly also been advanced in various forms by scholars working on 
collective violence. In an extreme example, Lang (2010) argues that within the 
death camps of the Second World War:  
 
What might look like the dehumanization of the other is instead a way to exert 
power over another human without ending the social relationship: it is an 
opportunity to sustain domination over the victims before (or even without) killing 
them… to make people the object of one’s power is not necessarily to objectify 
them, but can be rather to subordinate their subjectivity to one’s own.  
 
Still more radically, perhaps, Alan Paige Fiske and Tage Shakti Rai’s 
theory of ‘virtuous violence’ (2014) has recently sought to overturn the 
assumption that violence is the result of moral disengagement altogether. 
Arguing that it makes not more sense to explain violence as resulting from a lack 
of moral inhibitions than it would be to explain sex in the same way, they instead 
insist that nearly every example of violence can be understood in terms of 
attempts by the relevant actors to ‘regulate’ valued relationships. As such, even 
acts of violence that appear atrocious and incomprehensible to outsiders are, 
from the perpetrator’s point of view, fundamentally moral acts intended to, for 
example, justly chastise a subordinate; initiate individuals into a communal 
bond, get even with a perceived peer, or achieve a greater good by means of 
actions perceived as a necessary but proportionate evil.  
Viewing dehumanisation as part and parcel of the moral disengagement 
perspective, Fiske and Rai (2014, 156-159) express scepticism towards the value 
of the concept of dehumanisation in explaining collective violence. However, 
their critique of dehumanisation is surprisingly limited, and they are forced to 
concede empirical evidence as to its relevance. What they do not attempt to do is 
to reconsider – as I am attempting to do here – whether the role of 
dehumanisation in explaining acts of collective violence is in fact limited to its 
role in effecting moral disengagement. Indeed, taking the argument of this 
section to perhaps its ultimate extreme, it has even been proposed that the 
causal relationship between dehumanisation may sometimes be the precise 
inverse of what the moral disengagement perspective stipulates. Rather than 
dehumanisation serving to sever the moral relationship between perpetrator 
and victim and thus make possible violence, violence can serve to humanise the 
victim in the eyes of the perpetrator and thus make possible a relationship 
between the two. This is precisely what the theorist of global jihadism, Faisal 
Devji (2005) proposed when he hypothesised that:  
 
The vast technological and numerical superiority of the airborne US troops 
deployed against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban then, quite inadvertently replays media 
pieces about the war between robots and humans, airborne and earth-based power, 
that are familiar from films such as Dune, Terminator or Matrix. In such epic 
confrontations, naturally, it is the very peculiarity and even savagery of the holy 
warrior that renders him more human and the American soldier who looks and 
behaves like a robot. It is in fact only the individualisation of the American soldier 
through his perversion, for example in the photographs of torture at Baghdad’s Abu 
Ghraib prison, that makes him human – that and his death, which, like that of 
Arnold Schwarzenegger in Terminator, renders the robot human by making him 
mortal.  
 
Indeed, developing this line of argument somewhat, it is possible to see 
even the conventional view of dehumanisation in collective violence as itself, in a 
sense, dehumanising, in so far as it assumes a model of human brotherhood 
which implicitly strips humans of one of the most fundamental human 
characteristics – their sociality. In situations of inter-group conflict, sectarian or 
ethnic killing of seemingly random members of particular groups – so called 
‘categorical terrorism’ (Goodwin 2006) seems to be the very pinnacle of 
dehumanisation, since it seemingly denies any moral relationship on a ‘purely 
human level’ between perpetrator and victim. But killing a person because of 
their membership of a particular group inherently acknowledges that that 
person is deeply embedded in meaningful collective ties and therefore worthy of 
a share of collective responsibility, as opposed to being socially atomised. 
Paradoxically, then, even the most appalling acts of systemic violence have been 
justified as being essentially humanising. For example, the political philosopher 
Carl Schmitt, who apparently remained the end of his life an unrepentant Nazi, 
insisted that liberal modernity was dehumanising precisely because it sought to 
strip humans of the fundamental attribute of their humanity, namely, 
membership of a political community worth killing and being killed for.   
 
Humanity and Inhumanity in Islamic State Propaganda  
 
 
 
 
Islamic State is today a byword for unrestrained and unapologetic 
‘slaughter’ (to use the group’s own word for what it does).2 Not only has the 
group systematically killed civilians and captured enemy fighters, it has typically 
acknowledged and openly celebrated these acts of killing, often incorporating 
them into explicit video propaganda. Moreover, Islamic State has freely 
acknowledged that it regularly kills people purely because of their membership 
of particular groups.  
By and large, however, there has been little surprisingly little interaction 
between the literature on jihadist groups, or religiously motivated groups more 
generally, and the mainstream literature on mass killing. Even the concept of 
‘sectarianism’ has tended to be defined in such a way as to present sectarian 
conflicts as little more than ethnic conflicts between groups of people who 
happen to look alike: who are what Brewer (1992) calls, ‘phenotypically similar’. 
This definition may well apply usefully to contexts such as Northern Ireland, 
where the relevant groups were defined by religion, but asserted secular claims. 
But it is not so clear that it applies to cases where groups espouse specifically 
religious ideologies. It is true that some studies of genocide do engage with 
episodes such as the Albigensian Crusade, (Chirot and McCauley, 2010), studies 
of mass killing (perhaps because of the dominance itself of the term genocide, 
which itself implies ethnic motivation) remain dominated by work on, first and 
foremost, the Holocaust, and then by episodes of slaughter in the context of 
colonialism and ethno-nationalist civil war. Also, as mentioned above, Mark 
Juergensmeyer’s notion of ‘satanisation’ remains perhaps the best grounded 
theory specific to the psychology of inter-religious killing, a concept which 
essentially  re-casts traditional notions of inter-ethnic dehumanisation in 
religious language.  But both examples are exceptional.  
Meanwhile the literature on violent Islamist (jihadist) groups in 
particular, emerging largely from Middle East Studies on the one hand and 
‘Terrorism Studies’ has tended to focus more on issues such as ‘radicalisation’ 
than the psychological explanations for the actors’ willingness to engage in acts 
of unrestrained killing. This is not to say that dehumanisation rejected as a 
fundamental explanatory process. References to ‘dehumanisation’ and related 
processes of moral ‘neutralisation’ exist in the literature, (Hoffman, 1995; Cottee, 
2010). It is just that the concept is seldom explored in any critical depth with 
regard to this particular set of cases. The same is true for the place of religiously 
motivated violence in the literature on mass killing more generally.  
 
The organisation which presently refers to itself as Al-Dawla Al-Islamiyya 
(the Islamic State), previously the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and, 
subsequently,  the Islamic State of Iraq, has, throughout its various iterations, 
differed from Al Qaeda – its parent organisation – in three main ways. 
(Alexander, 2015; Atwan, 2015; Berger and Stern, 2015; Cockburn, 2015; 
McCants, 2015). First, it has been consistently more interested in building a 
territorial state than in waging a ‘global jihad’. Second, it has been consistently 
                                                        
2 The word commonly used is dhabaha - a word that normally applies to the 
killing of animals for meat.  
practiced and preached a much more anti-Shiite sectarian agenda than the more 
conciliatory Al Qaeda and, thirdly, it has been much willing to commit itself to, 
and actually to use extreme violence in order to obtain local compliance. As such, 
it is an organisation which has practiced mass killing, and even genocidal actions 
(as in its history of violence against minority groups such as Yazidis and 
Mandaeans) more clearly, consistently and unapologetically than have Al Qaeda 
and its affiliates.  
Islamic State propaganda uses a rich vocabulary – much of it ultimately 
derived from canonical Islamic sources – to glorify itself and vilify its enemies. In 
this section, I will examine this discourse based on word counts taken from the 
recorded speeches issued by Islamic State’s official spokesman, Abu Muhammad 
al-Adnani, as well as quotations drawn from a wider range of sources, including 
Islamic State’s English language magazine, Dabiq, propaganda videos, and poetry 
and songs disseminated by Islamic State’s specialist Al-Ajnad Media.  
Language used by Islamic State to describe itself and its enemies of three 
basic sorts: religious and politico-religious labels, straightforward ‘virtue talk’ 
(Leader-Maynard: 2014) and – of primary interest for this paper – metaphorical 
language which compares IS itself, those it identifies as its constituents, and its 
enemies to animals and objects.  
Whether the mere use of animal-based metaphors to describe people 
amounts to dehumanisation is a moot point. A study by Haslam, Loughnan and 
Sun (2011) suggested that out of 40 common animal metaphors used in 
language, ‘offensiveness was predicted by the revulsion felt towards the animal 
and by the dehumanizing view of the target that it implied’, and that the 
meanings of animal metaphors centre on ‘disagreeableness, depravity and 
stupidity’. This distinction make sense if we continue to treat dehumanisation as 
exclusively applying to dichotomous, boundary-drawing acts of moral 
disengagement. It makes less sense in the light of the development of a more 
flexible concept of dehumanisation as discussed above. The notion of animalistic 
versus mechanistic  dehumanisation specifically implies that metaphors, 
consistently used, have consequences for the attributes inferred about groups of 
people. The idea of infra-humanisation suggests that gradations are possible in a 
person’s level of perceived humanity. The idea that it is possible to distinguish 
between ‘dehumanisation’ and ‘toxification’ (Neilsen, 2015) specifically assumes 
that the specifics of words matter. How is describing a greedy person as a pig 
different from describing a morally despicable or worthless person as a 
cockroach, except in degree? And how is the variable of dehumanisation saliently 
altered depending on whether a person or a group is being described using such 
terms?  
Putting aside for the time being whether it amounts to genuine 
‘animalistic dehumanisation’ Islamic State propaganda uses a fairly specific 
inventory of animal-comparisons. The two that feature most prominently 
(accounting for more than 60% of animal-based metaphors) are lions, and dogs. 
Unsurprisingly, most references to lions in Islamic State propaganda refer to 
Islamic State’s own fighters, to the extent that ‘lion’ is practically a synonym for 
mujahid. Moreover, it might readily be objected that comparison with lions is 
neither pejoratively intended, nor does the metaphor centre on notions such as 
‘disagreeableness’ ‘depravity’ or ‘stupidity’.  
The word dog is, in normal Arabic usage, a straightforwardly pejorative 
term which insults the person to whom it is applied by comparison with an 
animal culturally considered unclean. It is therefore a plausible conduit for 
dehumanizing notions. As it turns out in Islamic State propaganda, however, two 
apparently distinct usages of ‘dog’ occur. In – and only in – specific quotations 
from the Sunna of the prophet Muhammad, Islamic State draws attention to the 
notion that ‘the blood of the unbelievers does not equal that of a dog’. (al-Adnani, 
2012). Here, the significance of the dog appears to be simply that dogs are, 
according to some schools of Islamic thought, considered to be najis or ritually 
impure.  
Whenever IS refers to groups or individuals as dogs in its own words, 
however, it invariably seems to have a more precise meaning in mind. Here, the 
word is used to imply two key attributes (as well as, presumably, the implicit 
notion of uncleanliness): ferocity and (misplaced) loyalty. In this usage, the word 
applies either to groups of Sunni Muslims opposed to Islamic State or, more 
occasionally, to specific individual non-Sunni Muslims (as, for example, when 
Nouri al-Maliki is referred to as the ‘dog of Iran’ or the House of Saud are the 
‘dogs of the Jews’ or Obama is ‘your’ (America’s) dog. It is, virtually without 
exception, never applied to groups of non-Sunni Muslims.  
In contrast to the notion of the ‘dog’, the ‘lion’ metaphor as used by IS 
seems an unlikely candidate for conveying dehumanising claims. As Haslam, 
Loughnan and Sun argue, animal metaphors can be used to convey the idea that 
people are ‘desirably wild’. However, in referring comparing its own to lions, IS 
is not merely claiming that they are courageous or ‘lion-hearted’. Rather, it 
characterises lions and mujahidin as ferocious, ravenous and merciless 
predators.  wolf, hyena, fox or the snake.  
In short, the image of the ‘lion’ in the meaning system of IS propaganda 
seems to double with that of the dog (and to a lesser extent, other predatory 
animals, such s the wolf, hyena or fox to which its enemies are more infrequently 
compared). Both lions and dogs (or wolves, or hyenas) are understood as 
ferocious, carnivorous, predatory and loyal (at least to one another). The 
difference is in this case one not of attributes but purely of essence – lions are 
ritually pure and inherently noble, while the other animals are not. If, as argued 
above, dehumanisation can also entail ‘self-dehumanisation’ or 
‘superhumanisation’, then attributing to one’s own clearly animal-like 
characteristics even with complimentary intent is arguably a form of 
dehumanisation.  
Another set of animal metaphors used by Islamic State works to position 
groups as passive victims – prey animals. While the number of references in the 
corpus of speeches by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani is too small to draw firm 
conclusions here, it appears that a similar doubling may occur, whereby 
references to Sunni Muslims being slaughtered compare them to cattle whereas 
references to other groups compare them to sheep. Sometimes, unbelievers are 
also described as being killed by the mujahidin ‘like flies or cockroaches’. (Al-
Adnani, 2012) While flies and cockroaches are commonly associated with filth 
and disgust, the main purpose of this comparison, when used, seems to be 
illustrative simply of the ease with which the mujahidin are able to kill their 
enemies.  
Generally, when Shiites, who are seen by Islamic State as its primary 
enemy, are referred to as  group they are not compared to unclean animals, but 
are instead simply described directly as ritually unclean – najis, qadhir or danas. 
These terms appear to be reserved for Shiites and, in more specific and 
occasional instances, for other non-Muslims. By contrast, the deeds of Sunni 
Muslims with whom IS disagrees are sometimes described using the word 
khabith, which means ‘dirty’, or ‘malignant’, but in a more ordinary sense.    
Perhaps surprisingly, IS seldom directly refers to non-Muslims using 
animalistic or toxifying language. Where such language does occur, it refers 
either to individuals (Obama, for example, is described as a dog or a mule), or it 
appears in the context of direct quotations from the Sunna, as opposed to 
statements made is IS’s own words.  
What is the significance of this language, and is it to be understood as 
‘dehumanising’? IS, in common with mainstream Islamic theology, 
conceptualises human nature in terms of the notion of fitra, a concept which 
refers more generally to the notion of divine order, and an appropriate and 
ordained set of behaviours mandated for each category of being. An article in 
Dabiq (2014) Muslims are warned that living among non-Muslims may pose 
risks to the purity of their fitra. Such notions of purity are closely reminiscent of 
ethnic and racial distinctions, and are reinforced by claims about the ritual 
impurity of the blood of unbelievers. At the same time, however, fitra is not 
clearly an anthropocentric concept of human nature, since it concerns not so 
much the question of what distinguishes humans from animals, as the question 
of what the proper nature is of all types of divinely created being.  
Elsewhere, however, IS does draw a distinction between humans and 
animals. But this distinction is founded not so much on essentialist notions of 
inherited superiority or inferiority, but rather on the association between the 
situation of animals and a Darwinian (or Hobbesian) struggle for survival.  As 
Abu Muhammad al-Adnani insists.  
 
Without this condition [Islamic law] being met, authority becomes nothing more 
than kingship, dominance and rule, accompanied with destruction, corruption, 
oppression, subjugation, fear, and the decadence of the human being and his 
descent to the level of animals (Al-Adnani: 2013)  
To humanize people, in this belief system, is to socialize them within the 
Islamic system, outside of which atrocious and unending violence is simply an 
inevitability. As such, IS takes pride in the ‘harshness’ which its members display 
towards those outside the group, often seeking to emphasise the contrast 
between the ‘soft-heartedness’ of the mujahidin towards fellow believers and 
their merciless ‘harshness’ to outsiders.  
In other words, it would seem that when IS describes its own fighters, or 
its enemies, as savage predators, the intention is equally to strip them of human 
attributes within the context of their interaction. Indeed, notwithstanding IS’s 
black and white world view, whereby it is entirely good and its enemies entirely 
bad, its rhetoric very frequently uses the device of presenting itself and its 
opponents as mirror images, such that its opponents are presented as 
unrelentingly hostile in the same terms as IS is unrelentingly hostile to them, and 
as being mutually supportive of one another in the same way that IS is mutually 
supportive of its own. The enemy are kuffar with respect to what IS believes, but 
IS also stresses the point that they are kuffar with respect to what the enemy 
believes.  There is a tension of emphasis, then, in IS rhetoric between an 
ultra-nationalist discourse which promotes the notion of Sunni Muslims as a 
nation among nations, and savagery as the outcome of the frustration of their 
national ambitions and, on the other hand, a universalism which seeks to 
conquer the world and which therefore recognizes no possibility of coexistence. 
And this tension is reflected in its understanding of humanity and inhumanity – 
that is, whether inhumanity is a primarily a product of the savagery that results 
from conflict, and which therefore may characterize its own fighters as well as 
those of those of the enemy, or whether its enemies are inherently less human 
than its own.  
 
As one speech puts it:  
And the individual unbelievers who do not gather together in enmity and hostility 
against Islam, Islam offers its guarantee of security to these people in the Lands of 
Islam, and Allah - Glorious and Majestic - has commanded us that we must be 
neighbourly towards them until they have heard the word of Allah, then we shall 
make our calling to them [nablaghhum] concerning their beliefs without 
exaggerating in any way, because Islam is watchful over every heart that it should 
be advised and guided, and that it should return, yes, because it is the way of mercy 
and right guidance, not the way of hostility and massacre, for indeed it makes jihad 
with the sword in order to break the material strength of brutality and iniquity, 
which attempts to which attempts to come between individuals and hearing the 
words of Allah, and attempts to come between them and the knowledge that Allah 
sent down, and attempts to come between them and guidance, just as it attempts to 
come between them and the liberation of the slave from slavery, and to disperse 
them to the worship of things other than Allah, and whoever is well aware of this, 
know that the mujahidin, when they kill the uncivilised,  [ghashim], oppressive, 
hostile unbeliever, the one upon whom guidance is a lost cause [may’us min 
hadayya], whose blood, from Allah’s [point of view] does not equal that of a dog, 
[they do it] in order, by him, to save others, and convey them successively, to 
paradise, and the Islamic State has not established the bitterness of the ages on one 
inch of ground, unless it was to protect blood and have mercy and forgiveness on 
those who make war on it and shed the blood of its sons. Thus history did not know 
a conquest more merciful than that of the Muslims, and it will always remain the 
teaching [qawl] of the Islamic State towards its enemies after [it has] established 
[itself over them] “go, for you have been released”. (Al-Adnani: 2012)  
Here the notion that the unbeliever’s blood is worth less than that of a 
dog seems to be deliberately nuanced to refer not to unbelievers in general, but 
only to the ‘uncivilised’ or ‘hostile’ unbeliever. And yet, for IS, ‘civilization’ is of 
course ultimately synonymous with what it understands to be Islamic order. 
As we have just seen, Islamic State propaganda contains uses of language 
suggestive of ideas of dehumanization, but the picture is not clear-cut. 
Comparisons suggestive of ‘animalistic’ dehumanization seem to be applied 
more commonly to those perceived to be treacherous members of Islamic State’s 
own moral community to outsiders, and this language serves not to dissociate 
these people from the community, but rather to express moral judgment. 
In this section, I consider the question from the opposite angle, by 
focusing on how far dehumanizing representations and beliefs appear in the way 
IS presents and justifies its own acts of violence.  
As a rule, IS is notoriously candid about its own violent practices. For 
example, in issue 9 of Dabiq magazine a woman (presumably) writing under the 
pen name of Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah expresses her ‘alarm’ that: 
 
Islamic State supporters (may Allah forgive them) rushed to defend the Islamic 
State… after kafir media touched upon the State’s capture of the Yazidi women. So 
the supporters started denying the matter as if the soldiers of the Khilafah had 
committed a mistake or evil. (2015)  
In her rebuttal of Islamic State’s own supporters, she is at pains to argue 
that the practice of taking concubines in war is well attested and legitimately 
Islamic.  
A similarly unapologetic account appeared previously in the same 
magazine concerning IS’s original treatment of Iraqi Yazidis on capturing the 
Jabal Sinjar region.  
 
Upon conquering the region of Sinjar in Wilayat Ninawa, the Islamic State faced a 
population of Yazidis, a pagan minority existent for ages in the region of Iraq and 
Sham. Their continual existence to this day is a matter that Muslims should question 
as they will be asked about it on Judgement Day, considering that Allah had 
revealed Ayat as-Sayf (the verse of the sword) over 1400 years ago… Prior to the 
taking of Sinjar, Shari’ah students in the Islamic State were tasked to research the 
Yazidis to determine if they should be treated as an originally mushrik group or one 
that originated as Muslims and then apostatized, due to  many of the related Islamic 
rulings that would apply to the group, its individuals and their families. Because of 
the Arabic terminologies used by this group to describe themselves or their beliefs, 
some contemporary Muslim scholars have classified them as possibly an apostate 
sect, not an originally mushrik religion, but upon further research, it was 
determined that this group is one that existed since the pre-Islamic jāhiliyyah, but 
became “Islamized” by the surrounding Muslim population, language, and culture, 
although they never accepted Islam nor claimed to have adopted it. The apparent 
origin of the religion is found in the Magianism of ancient Persia, but reinterpreted 
with elements of Sabianism, Judaism, and Christianity, and ultimately expressed in 
the heretical vocabulary of extreme Sufism. Accordingly, the Islamic State dealt with 
this group as the majority of fuqahā’ have indicated how mushrikīn should be dealt 
with. Unlike the Jews and Christians, there was no room for jizyah payment. Also, 
their women could be enslaved unlike female apostates who the majority of the 
fuqahā’ say cannot be enslaved and can only be given an ultimatum to repent or face 
the sword. After capture, the Yazidi women and children were then divided 
according to the Sharī’ah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated 
in the Sinjar operations, after one fifth of the slaves were transferred to the Islamic 
State’s authority to be divided as khums. (Dabiq, 2014) 
 
Worthy of note here is the relatively careful treatment of Yazidi beliefs, 
which, contrary to wild rumours of Satan worship prevalent in online discussion, 
appear to be roughly in line with mainstream expert claims about the tenets of 
Yazidism.  Nor, again, are Yazidis denigrated as such – beyond the matter-of-fact 
assessment of the group as ‘originally mushrik’. It should go without saying, of 
course, that this almost bureaucratic language masks the visceral brutality 
experienced by Yazidis in practice.  
The account provided by IS for its massacre and mass enslavement of 
Yazidis in Iraq is interestingly contrasted by an account in the previous of Dabiq 
explaining IS’s notoriously brutal treatment of the Shu’aytat tribes in Syria and 
Iraq.  
…many Muslims sitting at home, living in “modernized” societies, never 
experiencing war or tribalism, naively said to themselves “he [Abu Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi] is declaring war on whole tribes! How can that be done? What do 
individual members of the tribe have to do with the actions of specific tribe 
members, or even with the decisions of tribal elders? The problem with these 
people is that they know nothing about human societies except what they have 
experienced in the “modernized” cities of the world, where tribalism has died out, 
and where the few tribes that still exist no longer play any important role as whole 
entities in their societies and communities. These people assume that the “modern-
day” city of individuality and individualism is all that exists outside their homes.  
 
However, this case is different in many parts of the world, particularly in the more 
rural and nomadic regions. There the tribe – when intoxicated by jahiliyya – still 
acts like a body with some kind of bigoted head or like a gang maddened by the mob 
mentality of extreme ignorance. They might move like a flock of birds or school of 
fish, albeit less gracefully due to their extreme ignorance. When one experiences 
tribes of this nature after living years in the city, he realises the wisdom of Shaykh 
Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. It also becomes easier for him to tie events related in the 
Sunnah and Sirah of the prophet with events today. He then knows why the prophet 
treated the Arab and Israelite tribes as collective wholes whenever tribe members 
broke their covenants with him. (Dabiq, 2014)  
 
This latter account seems to be remarkable in two ways. In the first 
paragraph, what we find amounts to a critique of modernity of which Carl 
Schmitt (1976) might very well have approved. To develop its line of argument, 
one might say that just as nationalists, brought up within nation states, look at 
the world beyond and see it as primordially divided into aspiring nations; and 
just as religious fundamentalists such as IS look at the world and order it into 
confessional groupings on the model of the Islamic Ummah so, with similar self-
delusion, do citizens of post-nationalist states look at their own societies, see 
them as self-consciously imagined communities, and hence see the whole world 
as made up of similarly negotiable constructions. But where collective solidarity 
is a social fact, it legitimates collective violence no less than is judicial violence 
justified by similarly mythical beliefs in individual responsibility.    
And yet this argument is apparently insufficient, given that it is then 
necessary, after all, to fall back on two remarkable and dehumanizing metaphors 
which do indeed seem designed to ‘nullify’ and ‘morally disengage’ from the 
suffering caused by Islamic State’s actions. Yet again, it is interesting that this 
language seems necessary specifically where the victims are fellow Sunni 
Muslims, rather than religious outsiders.  
Indeed, this paragraph seems to offer a valuable starting point for considering 
what does amount to dehumanization in the context of IS rhetoric. Here, the 
description of Shu’aytat tribespeople is dehumanizing in terms of the theoretical 
literature strictly because: 
- The tribespeople are denied individual agency – not simply because the 
tribe is discussed as a group, but because it is specifically stated that 
individual tribespeople do not think and behave as individuals  
- The tribespeople are denied culture – in contrast to Yazidism, which is 
characterized as a specific religion with a history and a particular set of 
beliefs, the tribalism of the Shu’aytat is a purely negative phenomenon 
arising from their pre-Islamic ‘extreme ignorance’ (jahiliyya) with which 
they are ‘intoxicated’  
- The tribespeople are denied intelligence and emotional sensitivity, when 
they are described not only as animal-like but as exhibiting ‘less elegance’ 
than the animals with which they are compared  
Agency and individuality, as noted in the theoretical review above, 
correspond to the ‘human nature’ attributes denial of which is ‘mechanistic 
dehumanisation’. Intelligence and culture correspond to the ‘uniquely human’ 
attributes, denial of which constitutes ‘animalistic dehumanisation’. Both are 
apparently present in the paragraph justifying indiscriminate massacres of the 
Shu’aytat. Neither is clearly present in the one justifying violence against the 
Yazidis. But how representative are either of these examples of IS’s official 
understanding of its acts of killing overall?  
While textual sources such as those relied on up to now, offer a useful 
starting point for anatomising IS’s basic arguments for violence, a richer 
resource for understanding how it wishes its violent acts to be perceived can be 
found in its copious video propaganda. While, in fact, the bulk of Islamic State’s 
video output does not feature violence, focusing rather on the organisation’s 
ability to govern the territory it rules effectively, graphic scenes of slaughter 
were – particularly in the months following IS’s establishment of its self-
proclaimed caliphate – a key part of its overall message. Moreover, these videos 
– particularly in their longer-form examples often seem deliberately designed to 
provide a broad presentation of IS’s violent activities, dealing with multiple 
enemy groups and forms of killing.  
Killing, as represented in Islamic State videos falls into basically four categories: 
battlefield killing, in which IS fighters are shown overrunning the positions of 
their enemies and exulting over their dead bodies; ‘hunting’ in which IS fighters 
track down and kill individual enemies, shooting them in their cars or invading 
their homes; massacres, in which IS kills large numbers of captured enemies –
and, finally, executions, which differ from massacres in that they are presented 
as more ritualized and elaborately staged events. Executions in turn can be 
approximately subdivided into executions of ‘political’ opponents and judicial 
executions of ‘criminals’ such as homosexuals, witches or traitors. This latter 
category overlaps with videos of non-lethal violence such as limb-amputations.  
Individuality and Emotion  
Acts of killing by IS vary in how much attention is given to the victims as 
individual subjects. Scenes of captured militants lying face down and being 
machine gunned en masse are common. However, even where people are killed 
en masse, IS is often propagandistically interested in according them some kind 
of identity or individuality. In battlefield sequences, the camera often dwells on 
the contorted faces and bodies of dead enemies. In the video On the Path of the 
Prophet (2015) there is a sequence in which a large group of captured Syrian 
soldiers is massacred. Emphasis is placed on showing the terror on individual 
faces. In the ‘hunting’ sequences, the identity of those killed by IS is emphasized 
in an attempt to prove the victims’ ‘guilt’. In group beheadings, significant effort 
may go into visually introducing the victims as individual subjects by using 
reaction shots and other close-ups of their faces as the execution proceeds. In the 
mass beheading sequence in Though the Disbelievers Dislike It, (2015) victims are 
clearly introduced early on, with especial emphasis being placed on a young, 
good looking man who is beheaded by Muhammad Emwazi. In Soothing the 
Believers’ Chests, (2015) in which the captured Jordanian pilot Mu’adh al-
Kasasbah is burned to death, the execution sequence follows a lengthy interview 
which seems to function as a confession. The sequence itself uses rapid cascades 
of images to create the impression of cinematic ‘flashback’ which, interwoven 
with facial-close ups create the impression of offering a window into the 
thoughts of the penitent victim prior to death. Even where killing is much less 
personal, however, IS may accuse its victims of quasi-individual crimes. In Come 
up behind them and put them to flight (2015) a jihadi can be seen screaming at a 
heap of recently killed Iraqi army soldiers, asking them “why do you insult 
‘A’isha? ‘A’isha is our mother!”   
Culture and Intelligence  
A notoriously crucial dimension of IS violence is cultural destruction and 
IS videos frequently include scenes of cultural destruction alongside, and indeed 
as the culmination of sequences featuring the destruction of human bodies.  
When it smashes statues of ancient Middle Eastern civilizations, and in 
bulldozing or blowing up archaeological sites; or when it blows up Shiite 
mosques or smashes Shiite icons, its primary stated motivation is simply to 
destroy what it believes to be shirk or idol worship. However, IS is also acutely 
and explicitly aware of how far the cultural artifacts it destroys are valued by its 
enemies and the anguish it causes in breaking them. In issue 8 of Dabiq (2015) it 
notes how:  
Last month, the soldiers of the Khilāfah, with sledgehammers in hand, revived the 
Sunnah of their father Ibrāhīm (‘alayhis-salām) when they laid waste to the shirkī 
legacy of a nation that had long passed from the face of the Earth. They entered the 
ruins of the ancient Assyrians in Wilāyat Nīnawā and demolished their statues, 
sculptures, and engravings of idols and kings. This caused an outcry from the 
enemies of the Islamic State, who were furious at losing a “treasured heritage.” The 
mujāhidīn, however, were not the least bit concerned about the feelings and 
sentiments of the kuffār 
 
Even at the moment of death, IS sometimes represents its victims as 
cultured beings. In Though the Disbelievers Dislike It, as the Syrian airmen who 
are about to be beheaded kneel in anticipation of their fate, their lips can clearly 
be seen to move – presumably in prayer. In A Message Signed in Blood the Nation 
of the Cross (2015) this is made explicit when the accompanying text says ‘they 
supplicate what they believe in and die on the path of hellfire’. In The Clashing of 
Swords, IS fighters disguised as Iraqi security forces enter a man’s house and lead 
him away. The terrified man keeps says, over and over again ‘I suspect that you 
are Da’esh, I suspect that you are Da’esh’ (an Arabic acronym for ‘The Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant’, sometimes considered pejorative). In another, a 
father and his son are made to dig their own graves together.  
Conclusion  
Dehumanisation, understood as a mechanism of moral disengagement 
implies precisely the opposite of what IS typically claims about its violent 
practices: that they are not personal. Indeed, it is the intimacy of IS violence, the 
group’s unflinching admission of many of its most problematic acts, the group’s 
apparent ability to place itself in its enemies’ shoes in order to better imagine 
how to inflict most suffering upon them that makes its actions so sensational and 
shocking.  
And yet, as this paper has argued, dehumanization has evolved into a 
subtler concept in recent years. And IS’s discourses about what is human and 
what is inhuman, and the way it relates these to violence, can be productively 
illuminated in terms of this. Rather than viewing its enemies as monolithically or 
simplistically subhuman, IS deploys notions of inhumanity in a situated, dynamic 
and even reflexive fashion. For IS, attributes of inhumanity may apply to both self 
and other, but ultimately are more to be located in the conflictual relationship 
that is understood to exist between the two.  
Another key point is that IS’s use of literally de humanizing language – i.e, 
language which seems to imply that certain categories of humans have traits 
similar to animals, is apparently mediated by the level and type of out-grouping 
that is going on. Perhaps surprisingly, it seems to be more likely to use animal 
comparison the closer those labelled come to the IS in-group. Sunni Muslims are 
subject to animal comparisons, and individual Shiites are occasionally when 
their shared status as Arabs is uppermost. By contrast, total outsiders – non-
Muslims and especially non-Muslim Westerners attract few negative epithets, 
perhaps because they do not need to be morally condemned in order to be 
portrayed as an enemy. The most extreme language – toxifying, rather than 
dehumanizing per se is applied to Shiites, who are the object of IS’s most 
significant genocidal ambitions. It may be that it is precisely because Shiites 
cannot easily be characterized in terms of dehumanizing language, whether in 
the form of moral judgements (which are irrelevant to those outside IS’s self-
identified moral community), or more literal, racialized notions of subhumanity 
(because Shiites are not seriously theorized by IS as differing in ethnic or racial 
terms), that they represent such a threat to the integrity of IS’s moral universe.  
Rather than seeing dehumanization as a one-dimensional process forming 
a link in a single chain leading ineluctably to mass killing of the dehumanized 
other by the humanized in-group, we do better to understand dehumanization as 
part of a tool kit of rhetorical moves which are available to those seeking to 
justify intercommunal violence in different contexts and situations. Elucidating 
these dimensions seems to offer rich opportunities for future research.   
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